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The market and water
management reform in Peru
Eduardo Zegarra
This article examines the unsuccessful attempts made in the 1990s
to introduce a market for water in Peru. This reform was thwarted
because market operations were identified with water rights privatization,
even though a market can perfectly well operate on a basis other than
that of private rights, with the State retaining full ownership of the
resource. The argument made here is that if these shortcomings were
corrected, the creation of a water market would be desirable to improve
allocation and management of water and to deal with the increasingly
serious difficulties associated with the administration of water access, the
lack of investment incentives and serious problems of efficiency and
equity. The economic advantages and disadvantages of a water market
are analysed, as are the legal and regulatory prerequisites for promoting
the kind of market that would really improve water allocation in the
increasingly necessary institutional reform of this sector in Peru.
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Over the past few decades, creating market mechanisms
for water allocation has been one of the most
controversial ideas in the debate about how best to
manage natural resources. This idea, which originally
came up in certain developed countries, has begun to
be raised in some developing ones that face growing
water shortages, such as Peru.
During the 1990s the Peruvian economic system
underwent a profound change, shifting from an approach
that relied heavily on State intervention in the economy
to a model of far-reaching liberalization and non-
interference by the State in the market. As part of this
economic liberalization approach, a radical proposal was
made to reform water legislation by privatizing water
rights and introducing a market system of allocation, a
model taken from the Chilean legislation then in force.
This option was not ultimately adopted, owing to the
objections of different social and political actors, and it
was never the subject of much public debate.
Against this background, a new government
initiative was recently launched to reform the legislation
and create new water management institutions. This
initiative drew on many of the ideas and debates of the
1990s, but it definitely ruled out the idea of privatizing
water, while keeping open the option of introducing
market mechanisms for its allocation.
This proposal is being widely debated in Peru.
One of the issues that is still controversial is the idea
of introducing a water market, as this continues to be
viewed as problematic by many social and economic
actors, particularly farmers, who consume 85% of the
water used in the country. The fear is that a market
mechanism may reduce access to water for agriculture
and favour other sectors with greater economic power,
and that it may become a source of legal uncertainty
for acquired rights. Likewise, different groups believe
that the water market may result in access being
affected by monopolistic dominance, and thus in water
access becoming more unequal. Generally speaking,
opposition to the idea of a water market has arisen as
part of an adverse reaction to water privatization,
confusing two different concepts.
It now seems essential for the future of water
management reform in Peru that the advantages and
disadvantages of a water market for the different user
types and for integrated water management be set forth
in a coherent way. It is also important to examine and
discuss the legal and regulatory requirements for an
efficient and sustainable market in a resource with the
special characteristics of water. The aim of the present
article is to review these issues and analyse in depth
the advisability and practicalities of introducing market
mechanisms for water management in Peru, a country
that has a history of controversy in this area dating back
to the 1990s.
II
The attempts to reform Peruvian
water legislation in the 1990s
A look at the legislative agenda of the Peruvian
Congress in the 1990s will show that almost every year
there were motions to debate and pass a new water law,
some of them tabled by the executive and others by
members of Congress itself. None of them was
successful, however, which is why the country still
does not have modern legislation on this very important
subject. In this section, the most important initiatives
will be described and the factors that have hitherto
made legislative change impossible will be examined.
Our analysis of these factors centres upon water
privatization and the operation of a market in this
resource. Both issues, which have frequently been
confused and poorly explained, have clearly
contributed to the difficulty of bringing about the
needed legislative change with the consent of users.
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1. Background
Water legislation in Peru has undergone partial reforms
in the last 30 years as administrative requirements and
particular needs or emergencies have dictated. Water
management between 1970 and 1980 tended to
continually weaken the system of authority and
planning established by the 1969 water act (Ley
General de Aguas). In the late 1980s the Government
decided to transfer critical water administration and
distribution functions to user organizations (mainly
irrigators), including the collection of tariffs. Then the
severe hyperinflation of the late 1980s greatly
weakened the State and its ability to finance public
activities, including water management.
In 1990 a major political and economic shift
began, marked by economic liberalization and a
subsequent weakening of the democratic system.1 In
particular, in 1991 the Government began to adopt a
series of drastic measures involving economic
liberalization and privatization of State assets, with the
basic objective of promoting private-sector investment.
There were specific investment promotion measures for
the different sectors. For one of these, agriculture, a
legal instrument was passed —the Ley de Promoción
de las Inversiones en el Sector Público Agrario
(D.L. 653)— that created certain incentives for
private investment in the extraction of underground
water, in contravention of the general law of 1969. At
this stage the Government began to consider the need
to enact a new water law compatible with the economic
liberalization then in progress.
2. The first attempt: copying the Chilean model
Thus, in late 1991 the Ministry of Agriculture decided
to engage a Chilean consultant to draft a water bill very
similar to that of Chile, which in 1981 had passed a
Water Code that privatized water rights and fully
introduced a market mechanism.
This initial proposal, however, was supplemented
by the Ministry of Agriculture with a series of
provisions to preserve bureaucratic powers in this area.
Thus, the draft that finally emerged was a mixture of
liberalization of rights and bureaucratization of
administration.
The original proposal also had problems of a
formal character, however. For example, it was
incompatible with the Constitution in force (of 1979),
which declared natural resources to be the property of
the nation; thus, water could not be privatized.
Furthermore, some doubts began to arise about the
Chilean legislation at that time: it was claimed, for
instance, that it encouraged speculation in water rights
by certain economic agents with a detrimental impact
on water access for vulnerable (indigenous) social
groups, and that its institutional framework was ill suited
to dealing with intersectoral conflicts, among other
things. These criticisms were actually evaluated by the
democratic Government that came to power in Chile in
1990, when it carried out a review of existing legislation.
Besides all this, the original proposal was not
properly analysed or discussed with a variety of
important governmental actors or among users. These
latter, and farmers in particular, rejected the proposal
outright. The main misgivings expressed by them
concerned the operation of a water market, which they
saw as having the potential to deprive them of access
to this resource through the operation of economic
interests. Environmentalist groups and water managers
were also opposed to the law, however, as they were
concerned about provisions in it which would weaken
State powers to regulate water.
3. The second attempt: some changes to the
model
Between 1993 and 1994 another attempt was made to
pass a new water bill, efforts being made this time to
overcome some of the limitations of the previous one.
In 1993 a new Constitution was passed. While
continuing to treat natural resources as the property of
the nation, it stipulated that they could be granted on
a concessionary basis. It also stipulated that Congress
should pass a constitutional law on natural resources
before passing laws dealing with specific resources
such as water.
In these new circumstances, the Ministry of
Agriculture, under pressure from the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Finance, decided to relaunch its
legislative proposal, but this time with some
amendments. For example, it now included a tax on
water rights with a view to preventing speculation. It
also incorporated some ideas about the management of
water at the basin level and consideration was given
to some limitations on the ownership of water from
natural sources.
1
 The regime of President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress in
1992, and then convened a new Congress with constitutive powers
which was to pass a new constitution in 1993. Fujimori’s
Government became increasingly authoritarian during the 1990s.
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This new bill had a very good chance of being
passed, especially in 1995-1996. At this stage, however,
opponents of the Ministry of Agriculture proposal
emerged within the Government itself, particularly in
relation to drinking water and sanitation, as they were
concerned by the possibility that the law might overturn
the priorities already set for drinking water
consumption. The bill was not ultimately passed and
when the Ministry of Agriculture changed, a new
situation arose.
4. The third attempt: a broader, multisectoral
approach
Following on from these efforts, in the 1996-1998
period a third attempt was made to enact a new water
bill in Peru. A multisectoral commission would be set
up within government, involving the main sectors
concerned: agriculture, water and sanitation, energy
and mining, economy and finance, and others. At this
stage a more comprehensive proposal for legislative
reform was to be drawn up, ruling out the privatization
of water rights and adopting a multisectoral approach
to this resource whereby a multisectoral authority
would be created instead of the traditional authority
within the agriculture sector.
This third attempt was never to come to fruition,
as the agriculture and economy and finance sectors lost
interest in the subject. In 1997 the Constitutional Law
for the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources was
finally passed, creating the general framework within
which specific laws like a water act could be created.
In 1999 and 2000 the political situation in Peru
became very fraught: President Fujimori was seeking
re-election for the second time and the country had
become seriously polarized. In those years there were
no major water legislation initiatives.
5. The most recent initiatives
In late 2000 the Fujimori Government fell and a
transitional Government headed by Valentín Paniagua
took office, before calling a general election and
handing over power in mid-2001 to the current
president, Alejandro Toledo. During the transitional
Government there was an attempt by the agriculture
sector to generate new legislation, with a water bill that
was published well in advance and debated by the
public for several months. This proposal contained
some interesting advances, but it was not an
improvement on the multisectoral effort of 1997-1998
as it still had a clear sectoral bias towards agriculture
and its definition of water rights contained ambiguities
that did not clarify the complex legal status of this
resource.
Subsequently, under President Toledo’s
Government, Supreme Resolution 122-2002-PCM was
enacted, creating the Multisectoral Commission to draft
a new water bill. The Commission, which would
include members of all the ministries and public bodies
concerned with water as well as private users in the
agriculture, mining, industry and urban sectors, was set
up in January 2003. It worked for four months and
produced a draft water bill which was publicized in
May that year so that it could be debated by the public.
The bill drafted by the Commission accepted the
principle that water was indivisible and that its
exploitation by multiple users required a balanced
institutional structure with a single technical and
regulatory authority to enforce the law and safeguard
the resource in its natural sources.2 The draft also
provided for an innovative way of binding the
institutional arrangements for water into the ongoing
regionalization process. Consejos de Cuenca (River
Basin Councils) would have been created at regional
and multi-regional level (depending on the actual
characteristics of river basins) as the basic authorities
for water management in the decentralized
administrations. In relation to these aspects there were
some initial disagreements between the members of the
Commission, but a reasonable consensus was
ultimately reached.
The part of the legislative proposal that generated
adverse reactions, however, especially in the farming
sector, was the proposed new system of water rights
based on the idea of water “concessions”, as set out in
the Constitutional Law for the Sustainable Use of
Natural Resources and the current Constitution itself.
Water concessions would give their holders a right of
usufruct over the resource under set conditions, but
would not give them ownership.
2
 The bill proposed to create a single national water authority of
high administrative rank, the Instituto Nacional del Agua (National
Water Institute), responsible for enforcing regulations, monitoring
water quality and quantity and granting water rights, among other
important functions. The Instituto Nacional del Agua would have
come under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, owing to
its multisectoral character, but would have followed the policies
and guidelines laid down by a Consejo Nacional de las Aguas
(National Water Council), also a multisectoral institution with both
public- and private-sector representation.
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Again, in accordance with what is laid down in the
Constitutional Law, the proposal included provisions
that allowed water concessions to be traded by their
holders, always provided the original conditions under
which they had been granted were met (i.e., provided
that no important features of the actual concession were
altered). In practice, this was tantamount to allowing a
market in water rights, albeit under different conditions
from those laid down by the Chilean legislation, which
is more privatist. In other words, a market could be
operated, but under the conditions laid down when the
concessions concerned were granted and without
prejudice to public ownership of the resource.
6. The initial reactions
The first reaction of users in the farming sector —the
most important one socially and the largest user of
water— was hostile to the draft, as this was regarded
as “a new attempt to privatize water”. This reaction,
which cannot be seen as justified by the form and
content of the proposal, even led to a national strike
in the sector and thence, in June 2003, to the
establishment of a state of emergency in the country,
in the midst of other mobilizations by teachers and
truck drivers.
In this situation, the Government decided to give
water users in the farming sector six months to come
up with an alternative proposal. The proposal drafted
by agricultural users was recently submitted to
Congress, and it is clearly hostile to the idea of a water
market. It also insists on a sectoral approach to water,
with agriculture pre-eminent above other sectors.
However, this hostility to the idea of a water
market basically centres around water privatization.
This is despite the fact that the two concepts are
distinct, since it is possible for a water market to
operate without water access rights having the
attributes of private property.3
The experience described shows that there has not
yet been a thorough debate in Peru as to the advantages
and disadvantages of bringing in a market mechanism
for water allocation or as to the right way of doing this
so that management efficiency, equity and
sustainability are improved. In the absence of such a
debate, the hostility to reform proposals does not seem
to be well founded, and action is needed urgently to
remedy the situation.
III
A market for water: advantages
and disadvantages
This section will analyse the advantages and
disadvantages for society of bringing in market
mechanisms for water allocation, both in conceptual
terms and for the specific case of a country going
through a management crisis, like Peru. The evaluation
will be carried out in the light of economic, social and
environmental objectives, and from the point of view
of integrated water management.
1. Water markets and economic efficiency
Properly functioning markets are one of the most
effective means of achieving economic growth,
understood as a continuous, sustainable expansion in
the material output of the population as a whole. For
a specific good, a properly functioning market enables
factors to be mobilized as required so that society as a
3
 In other words, privatization of water rights is not a necessary
condition for a market in water allocation, since trading can be in
conditional rights. This is what happens in most developed countries
with water markets.
whole obtains from them the greatest net benefit
possible.
In the case of water, which is a production input
for many activities, proper functioning of the market
concerns the allocation of this scarce resource to
different economic activities (i.e., activities that
generate economic value or benefits) or to different
economic agents with differing preferences. In a
situation where a (scarce) input has to be allocated to
various alternative activities or to a variety of agents,
the market can be said to be working well as an
allocation method when the input concerned goes to
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the activities or agents that set the highest value on it.
In other words, the input will have an
“opportunity cost” for each of the possible activities
or agents, and the most efficient allocation will be that
whereby no activity or agent has a different opportunity
cost for the input. If this were to happen, the input
could be reallocated, and society would obtain a greater
net benefit.
It is important, then, to realize that the efficiency
gains from the operation of a water market can be
substantial, to the extent that water is allocated to the
highest-value activities. Another crucial advantage of
the operation of a water market is that it tends to
encourage private investment both in infrastructure and
in water-saving techniques, insofar as private-sector
agents are able to appropriate the efficiency gains these
investments bring at the prevailing opportunity cost.
Efficiency gains can be affected, however, by
some fundamental factors which influence the
operation of markets. These can be classified into three
types: transaction costs, externalities and limited
competition. These factors can reduce and even reverse
potential efficiency gains from the operation of a water
market. We shall now consider how this may happen.
The issue of transaction costs relates to the
resources needed for the market to operate, both legally
and in terms of the information required for
transactions. When two agents are to trade a good,
information on important attributes of that good may
be limited and/or asymmetrical, and this affects the
potential benefits of the exchange. Likewise, the legal
requirements for carrying out transactions may be
burdensome and act as another complicating factor.
Thus, in a market with high transaction costs, potential
efficiency gains are reduced and in some cases even
disappear, if the water market cannot operate.
This market is a typical example of high
transaction costs for a variety of reasons (Young, 1986;
Colby, 1990). Firstly, water is a mobile good that is
difficult and costly to measure, so that resources are
needed to gauge its quantity and quality accurately.
Secondly, the legal status of water is usually complex
and an efficient technical and administrative apparatus
is needed to establish clear ownership rights and
maintain and update them over time. Lastly, the
reallocation of water in a fixed distribution system may
require costly infrastructure and operational alterations,
items that feature as transaction costs in any market
operation.
But while transaction costs tend to limit the
efficiency gains of a market (or even prevent it
operating),4 the presence of externalities can actually
result in net losses of efficiency in some situations.
There is an externality when the individual costs of an
economic action are smaller than (or different to) its
social costs.5
In the case of a water market, one of the possible
consequences of externalities is that users may become
more uncertain about their rights over this resource
when a market starts to operate. If there is not a suitable
institutional and regulatory6 framework to prevent the
market mechanism from affecting the rights of third
parties, efficiency losses may arise as users’ access
becomes less secure. This is a real possibility in
traditional irrigation systems in developing countries,
as these lack the technical and institutional capabilities
needed to ensure that the complex externalities of
potential transactions are fully internalized by the
parties to the transaction.
Lastly, one characteristic of an efficient market is
that it offers no opportunity for certain agents to
manipulate it for their own benefit. In other words,
there need to be conditions of open competition or
market entry. Only in conditions of open competition
are market actors not in a position to manipulate prices
and thus enhance their profits to the detriment of
society at large. This is a major problem when the
technological conditions exist for economies of scale
in the provision of a good or service, since under these
circumstances natural monopolies arise. The main issue
in this case is the regulation of monopolies to attain
the greatest social benefit possible under existing
technological conditions.
To sum up, the water market may generate
efficiency gains, but these will only materialize if the
market operates with low transaction costs within an
institutional framework that deals appropriately with
externalities, and is open to new entrants and
competition.
4
 Transaction costs can certainly reduce efficiency gains, but in
situations where water is increasingly scarce these costs tend to be
lower as a proportion of the benefits expected, and thus to be less
of a constraint on the operation of the market.
5
 In the operation of a market, externalities may arise when there
are non-participating agents who may be positively or negatively
affected by a transaction. In other words, the opportunity cost
perceived by the agents involved in the transaction does not fully
incorporate the costs perceived by all those concerned by it, so that
the outcome of the transaction may reduce the benefit to society
instead of adding to it.
6
 See section IV below.
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2. Water markets and equity
When we speak of achieving equity we have in mind
the goal of attaining equality opportunities so that
citizens can fully develop their physical and intellectual
potential in a context of democratic institutions and
individual freedoms. A properly functioning market
can promote equity in many circumstances. For
example, if there is a technological innovation that
favours greater use of unskilled labour (one of the most
important assets of the poor),7 a properly functioning
labour market will substantially raise the returns on
unskilled labour and thus make a significant
contribution to a more equitable society.
In the case of water, criticisms of the market
mechanism frequently allude to the possibility that the
exploitation of this resource will become less equitable.
Some economists respond by saying that it is almost
impossible for a water market to undermine equity,
since no agent would willingly participate in a water
transaction that ultimately detracted from his or her
well-being (Donoso, 1994; Lee and Juraslev, 1998).
However, adverse consequences for equity may derive
from possible side-effects of market operations that do
not necessarily affect those involved in the transaction.
The existence of high transaction costs may mean
that only some agents, generally those with most
economic power, participate in the market. In certain
contexts this can affect equity. The most important
problem of equity entailed by the operation of a water
market, however, comes from the presence of
externalities affecting vulnerable groups with few
means of responding to changes in the ground rules and
in water allocations. Thus, a water transaction may
improve the well-being of the parties to the transaction,
but have an adverse effect on the well-being of other
agents who are not participants, without this latter
effect being fully incorporated into the operation. This
can happen precisely because in a market context
resources are also needed to oppose transactions that
affect third parties. It is possible that those affected may
be the poorest actors, who are the least well endowed
with the resources needed to oppose transactions.8
3. Water markets and environmental objectives
By environmental objectives we mean those concerned
with the attainment of conditions for the sustainable
exploitation of natural resources and for the proper
conservation of environmental assets valued by present
and future generations.
The relationship between environmental
objectives and the functioning of the water market can
be very complex. In an institutional context where
environmental objectives are given no real expression
either within institutions or among decision makers, the
water market will tend to reflect this situation and is
very unlikely to have positive environmental effects
(Brisbane Institute, 2002). For example, if the overall
effect of economic policies is to favour rapid economic
growth with intensive use of contaminating processes,
the existence of a water market will only amplify this,
since water will be allocated to the activities favoured
by these policies.
This general consideration notwithstanding,
market mechanisms can be useful for attaining
environmental objectives under various circumstances.
For example, activating a water market is a very good
way of dealing with growing demand for this resource.
The traditional government response to growing
demand has been to construct water control and
distribution infrastructure. These projects have usually
had a negative environmental impact, so the market
solution is one option for avoiding or reducing effects
of this kind.
A water market can also play an environmentally
useful role, provided the necessary environmental
institutions exist, in protecting certain habitats that are
very important to different social groups. In developed
countries it has happened that under certain
circumstances these groups or the State have acquired
water rights to ensure the conservation of particular
ecosystems, without having to go through complex and
very expensive administrative reallocation schemes. To
do this, however, it is necessary for these groups
actually to have purchasing power or for the State to
have the fiscal resources for this type of operation. In
developing countries there is very little scope for this.
7
 We cannot regard as equitable a situation where large sections of
the population lack the minimum material conditions for existence
(poverty and extreme poverty), since these people cannot fully
develop their potential even if they are living in a democracy and
enjoy individual freedoms.
8
 One problem of equity often associated with the introduction of
water markets derives from the original allocation of water rights.
In many particular situations, rights initially go to the agents who
are best placed, economically and politically, to claim them. There
is no reason why this process should be equitable, and it may result
in major social groups losing water access rights because they lack
political or economic power. This possibility is not directly linked
to the operation of the water market, but to the allocation of water
rights. A reallocation of rights that did not entail market operations
would come up against the same problem.
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4. Multisectoral water management and the
market mechanism
As was pointed out earlier, water is a mobile, multi-
purpose resource that is used for virtually every
important economic activity: energy, agriculture,
industry, mining, fish farming, urban consumption and
sanitation, recreation and so on. The greatest economic
benefit that the existence of a market opens up is the
opportunity to allocate this increasingly scarce resource
to the activities society most values. Likewise, the
potential gains from the functioning of a water market
can also arise within specific sectors, where there might
be great inefficiency in the allocation of water and large
differences in the value society sets upon activities.9
Because of its special characteristics, water
inevitably requires a management system that allows
it to be used in an orderly and peaceful fashion in the
face of multiple demands. In any water control and
distribution system, technical decisions have to be
taken at certain levels of the system in relation to the
amount and quality of the resource; operation and
maintenance; distribution of the water in accordance
with established criteria; conflict resolution;
penalization of actions by users that affect the normal
allocation process, and other matters.
This range of functions cannot be dealt with
spontaneously by individual users of a system. In some
form or other there needs to be an “authority” to
perform these functions and take the necessary
decisions. Taken together, these short- and long-term
decisions constitute what we know as water
management, and this requires specific resources and
technical, organizational and coordination capacities.
The ways in which these functions are discharged in
different settings may vary for legal and historical
reasons, but the general effect will be to make orderly
water use viable. It is now time to consider the
advantages and disadvantages that might arise from the
introduction of market mechanisms for water
management in particular contexts.
One of the clear advantages of operating a water
market is that a price is generated for the resource
(opportunity cost), something that cannot happen when
allocation is administrative in nature. This information
is very valuable for efficient water management, and
the authority concerned will not have to generate any
other information to be able to make decisions whose
objective is efficient water allocation. If this is one of
the objectives of the authority, having a water market
in operation obviously creates a favourable setting
within which to achieve it.
Another advantage of having a market operating
is the way conflicts over water use between users of a
given system can be managed, especially in conditions
of extreme scarcity. In systems where allocation is
administrative, many users will become extremely
dissatisfied with their normal allocations at times of
scarcity and will begin to put pressure on the
distribution authority. When a market is operating, the
different needs and preferences of users in a situation
of scarcity can be processed through this market and
the authority will not come under pressure that may
ultimately weaken it and undermine its legitimacy.
Also, if the market works well, the way it allocates
water in a situation of extreme scarcity will probably
be more efficient and equitable than would be the case
with other methods.
The operation of a water market can create a
favourable setting for the attainment of efficiency and
equity. To achieve these objectives, however, it is also
necessary to have some quite specific and complex
management capabilities in place.
For the market to operate in an irrigation system,
for example, users need to have their individual water
rights clearly established and demarcated, and all
transactions must be processed and implemented by the
water distribution authority. In many cases the
authorities are not capable of establishing individual
water rights accurately, nor is it easy for them to
reallocate individual holdings, owing to the physical
constraints of irrigation systems. In these cases a
market may not be viable, because the authorities lack
the requisite management capabilities.
Likewise, there are conceivable circumstances in
which the operation of a water market may give rise
to conflicts and increase legal insecurity. If water rights
are not clearly established and there are numerous
externalities that are difficult to measure and
compensate, there is the possibility of serious conflicts
9
 In each of these activities, market mechanisms for water will be
introduced under specific conditions. For example, in sectors where
a natural monopoly is the rule (such as energy and drinking water),
it is vital for the service provider to be properly regulated to ensure
it does not abuse its dominant position. In this case the idea of a
market in water rights within an area covered by a single provider
does not make much sense; it might only do so were this provider
to buy water from other providers or sectors, or sell it to other
providers or sectors. The case of agriculture, though, offers a wider
range of possibilities for the operation of water markets within the
sector: conditions might be suitable for water rights to be traded
within irrigated areas and, of course, between agriculture and other
activities or other irrigated areas (Zegarra, 2003).
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that could hugely complicate the management of a
system instead of facilitating it.
These considerations indicate that the introduction
of market mechanisms for water allocation must
necessarily be accompanied by new capabilities and,
in many cases, by greater regulatory and management
powers for the authorities responsible for this resource.
It should come as no surprise that water markets in
developed countries are usually supervised closely by
the authorities concerned. These authorities have the
power to block transactions that do not comply with
certain technical or legal requirements, and to restrict
the activity of the market when the public interest is
in jeopardy. Even the distribution authorities chosen by
users themselves have restrictive powers vis-à-vis the
market, as a way of keeping to a minimum the number
of transactions that have adverse effects on third
parties. The following section will review some of the
legal and regulatory requirements for a properly
functioning water market.
IV
Regulatory requirements for the proper
functioning of a water market in Peru
The first requirement for a water market to operate is
obviously a legal one: a new law is needed establishing
that water users may trade their water rights (and
appropriate the benefits) under certain conditions, in
permanent or temporary transactions, within a sector
or between sectors. In a legal framework of this type,
it is essential to establish an institutional system
capable of generating certain elements that are
important for the proper working of this market,
particularly when it comes to managing and reducing
externalities, lowering transaction costs and preventing
the emergence of dominant positions in the market.
Firstly, it is necessary to identify the water rights
concerned at the aggregate and individual levels,
employing some objective parameter such as prior use.
This is an extremely complex process in the case of
agriculture, where access to water has been heavily
distorted by interest groups and there are no proper
records of individual or collective use. A complex and
tricky task will have to be performed here, that of
establishing a basic system of water rights for
allocation, taking technical, social and even political
factors into account. To this end it is clearly necessary
to design a participatory model so that current users
can show they have been making peaceful, continuous
use of the resource. The establishment of a basic
system of water rights is prior to and different from
the process of actually awarding these rights.
For water rights to be awarded it is necessary to
create and maintain an efficient public cadastre and
register of them that gives users full legal security in
respect of their rights and enables these to be traded
under suitable conditions. Furthermore, the authority
responsible for granting water rights has to be able to
formalize them reasonably quickly, thus avoiding
situations in which rights are unstable once acquired,
and to do so at a cost acceptable to users. These tasks,
which are very onerous and involve large costs, will
have to be performed in their totality by the political
and technical authorities, since if this process of
recognizing and registering water rights is not carried
out then there is no prospect of an efficient water
market operating.
In Peruvian agriculture, the great numbers and
dispersion of water users suggests that it will not be
possible to grant individual titles to farmers in the short
term, or even perhaps in the medium term. The most
advisable course, then, is to generate formal bulk water
rights (en bloque), for example, at the level of irrigation
committees (comisiones de regantes), which are
smaller units within irrigation councils (juntas de
regantes). Individual users may have individualized
rights within these bulk rights, but these will be
awarded by a process organized and financed by the
irrigation organizations themselves.
Also fundamental to the operation of a water
market is the regulatory system. As we have noted,
externalities are one of the greatest problems with such
a market (i.e., the positive or negative external effects
that transactions may have on non-participating
agents). It is necessary, therefore, to define clearly the
powers the water authority has for making transactions
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conditional on a commitment not to generate
externalities, or to provide compensation for them, and
for giving those potentially affected every opportunity
and means to participate in the authorization of
transactions. Furthermore, the authorities will have to
be highly skilled at measuring the impact of
externalities, something that entails better measuring
mechanisms and more resources for carrying out
studies and engaging specialist staff.
The subject of externalities is especially critical in
the case of intersectoral transactions, and in situations
where water is reused within the same sphere of use. In
both cases it is necessary to have the technical capacity
to establish and measure the impact of externalities, so
that these can be taken into account when water right
transactions are being authorized and negotiated.
Another basic element of regulation are rules to
avoid situations of dominance in the water market. An
important legal instrument for this purpose is the
establishment of a requirement of actual and
beneficial use of the water to prevent monopolization
of and speculation with water rights and to create
incentives for the market to operate more actively. In
Peru there is a body responsible for combating
monopolistic practices, the National Institute for the
Defence of Competition and the Protection of
Ownership (INDECOPI); this institution should establish
additional parameters to avoid situations of this kind
in particular cases.
The regulatory system also needs to give
consideration to environmental issues. In Peru there has
been a debate on environmental legislation and the
instruments the State has at its disposal to attain
environmental objectives. Under current legislation,
ministries are also the environmental authority, a
situation which is unfavourable to the attainment of
these objectives. In the case of water, the most
important issues are minimum quality standards and the
actual ability of the authorities to enforce them. There
seems to be a need to strengthen regulatory capabilities
in this area by creating a single water authority to
safeguard these standards. Another issue is the need to
establish the minimum flows required for environmental
purposes in rivers, and this could have some effect on
the establishment of rights and the operation of the
market.
Lastly, the operation of water markets will also
have a significant impact on the way water is managed.
In the case of agriculture, for example, the idea that
access to water depends on a growing and irrigation
plan or on what the farmer wishes to sow should be
done away with. Moving from this concept to the idea
that each user has a water allotment per hectare per
year (proportional to the supply available that year, for
instance) involves a very large shift in the way water
is managed in the main irrigation systems of the
Peruvian coast. This will necessitate training for the
staff involved in water administration.10
V
Experience with water markets
in other countries
There is not a large volume of research into the role
and implications of water markets, largely because
markets of this kind are not easily developed owing to
institutional, economic and political factors (Young,
1986). Since the 1980s, however, interest in the subject
has increased in both developed and developing
countries. In developing countries it has been growing
since Chile’s water market was opened up in the 1980s,
and the subject is now turned to more frequently both
by international agencies and researchers and by
political authorities and environmental activists, a trend
which will probably continue or increase in future
given the need to find alternative institutional
mechanisms for the efficient allocation and use of this
vital resource (Lee and Juraslev, 1998).
At present, most of the theoretical and empirical
literature on water markets comes from developed
countries, particularly arid zones that are well
developed economically such as the west and south-
west United States, some regions in Spain, and
Australia. Markets play an important role in the
10
 Agriculture consumes 85% of water in Peru.
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intersectoral distribution of water in these areas,
whereby urban and industrial users acquire water from
agriculture. There are also water markets within the
agricultural sector in these areas, either for the trading
of rights or for temporary leasing of water access. As
regards Latin America, some important studies have
been carried out in Chile and Mexico, countries where
the water market is already a fact of life both in
agriculture and in other sectors.
A review of the literature on the subject reveals
that many of the authors concerned have begun to
analyse in greater detail the advantages and
disadvantages of introducing a market mechanism for
water allocation at a time when shortages are increasing
and the traditional administrative methods of allocation
are breaking down. One of the arguments in favour of
a market is that users (especially farmers) really are
beginning to value water as an economic good whose
efficient management can bring practical benefits. The
market is also regarded as more effective at responding
to the continuous changes that characterize the supply
and demand of this resource (which is at once mobile
and costly to measure and administer), as compared to
the rigidity of traditional administrative allocation
methods (Lee and Juraslev, 1998).
Some studies that merit particular attention when
analysing water markets in developed countries are the
recent one by Hanak (2002) for California, and the joint
study by the Australian Academy of Technological
Sciences and Engineering (ATSE, 1999) for Australia.
Likewise, the studies of Colby, Randall and Bush
(1993) present wide-ranging empirical information on
the operation of water markets in the arid states of the
United States and find shortcomings at different levels
that limit the efficiency of these markets, although this
does not mean they are less efficient than schemes of
an administrative nature. These studies deal with fairly
mature water markets whose complexities go far
beyond anything yet seen in developing countries.
An interesting study of the working of a water
market in United States agriculture is that of Miller
(1987), who carries out an empirical analysis of the
conditions under which a water market controlled by
the owners of the resource is more efficient than a
largely unregulated market, owing to the problem of
externalities among interdependent irrigation users in
a given water distribution system.
Studies of the workings of water markets in Chile
can be grouped into two clearly defined tendencies.
One group of researchers believes that the water
market in Chile has had quite positive effects in terms
of efficiency (Hearne and Easter, 1995; Thobani,
1997), and that this contributed to the remarkable
growth of the Chilean agricultural sector in the 1980s
and 1990s.
Another group of researchers has been more
cautious and suggested that the Chilean water
legislation, with its clear preference for private rights,
ended up by creating serious problems of hoarding and
rigidity in the allocation of these rights that have not
been and cannot be resolved by the market itself
(Bauer, 1995; Solanes and Dourojeanni, 1995). The
criticisms of this group are directed against
shortcomings in the original allocation of rights and
problems generated by private control of the resource,
but not necessarily against the operation of the water
market itself, which may be having positive effects
despite its shortcomings and limitations.11
11
 In my own research into the workings of a water market in
agriculture, in the Chilean valley of Limarí (Zegarra, 2002), I found
that this market had been beneficial for agricultural development in
the region, but also that its functioning could be affected by the
production structure of the valley and variability in the water supply,
even within a highly regulated system. Indeed, the widespread
cultivation of high-value permanent crops in the valley and the
occurrence of a severe drought three years in a row gave rise to
certain problems for the operation of the water leasing market,
including highly volatile pricing and adverse effects on short- and
long-term investment.
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of water rights used and the institutional arrangements
for managing and regulating these. The furthest-
reaching option is a system of rights that can be bought
and sold between and within sectors, and all of whose
attributes are also tradable (leasing, mortgaging, option
for future use), without the involvement of the
administrative authority.
Intermediate or conditional formulas for the
operation of water markets are more common in the
developed countries. In particular, legislation may give
the administrative authority a large share of decision-
making power over intersectoral transactions, as very
complex interests can be involved. The legislation may
also give organized users themselves the power to limit
transactions with other sectors or within each sector.
Lastly, it may be stipulated that only a given attribute
of the water right (such as temporary use, or leasing)
can be traded, under set conditions defined by the user
organization itself.
Looking ahead, another key challenge is to have
the most thorough debate possible on the advantages
and disadvantages of the water market in the case of
agriculture, a sector which at present is radically
opposed to this mechanism. What needs to be argued
first and foremost is that this market should be subject
to different degrees of administrative regulation and that
it is possible to improve its functioning so that it is suited
to the needs of agricultural producers in each particular
case. Indeed, the very decision to introduce the market
mechanism may be left for irrigation partnerships to take
of their own accord, as happens in Spain.
What has to be explained, though, is that the
opportunity for farmers to trade water among
themselves does have some major advantages for them.
The ability to quantify savings (efficiency gains) in
water use creates a clear incentive to invest in
techniques and practices that economize on this
resource: without this incentive, farmers see no benefit
from saving water and lack efficiency signals. In the
face of serious soil degradation problems, this possibility
is very attractive as a policy instrument. Likewise, a
water market increases the overall efficiency of
agricultural production in the face of large fluctuations
in the water supply and gives farmers whose crops are
more profitable but who are more exposed to risk when
The debate about a new water act that has been under
way in Peru over the last decade indicates that the idea
of introducing a market mechanism to allocate water
rights is still highly controversial and very much
associated with the idea of “privatization” of these
rights, even though the two concepts are distinct.
Protests have mainly come from agricultural users, who
believe that a mechanism like that of the market would
ultimately harm their interests, although they have not
made it clear why this should be so.
This being the case, Peru needs to press on with
a thorough debate about the advantages and
disadvantages of introducing a market mechanism in
the water management reform that is needed. Even if
the idea is rejected, this rejection should not be
formulated until the issue has been discussed in an
informed way.
First of all, the current debate is still being
influenced by that of the 1990s, when the proposal to
create a water market was directly related to the model
established by the legislation of Chile, where the
introduction of a market mechanism was accompanied
by water privatization. Furthermore, the original
attempts to change the Peruvian water legislation were
made in an increasingly authoritarian context, with
little debate, so that users in the agriculture sector were
left in great uncertainty about a potentially radical
change in water access rules.
Thus, despite the renewal of democracy in Peru,
where issues of this kind are the subject of national
debate, the background referred to is still distorting the
discussion of water legislation reform. Consequently,
the first, indispensable task is one of conceptual
clarification to draw a sharp distinction between the
current proposals and those that prevailed in the 1990s
(especially up to 1996) and to highlight the differences
with the Chilean Water Code.
Secondly, the debate is still very polarized. For
example, the subject of the water market is discussed
as though there were just one single option, whereas
there could be numerous formulas that included social
regulation and oversight of this market in accordance
with specific criteria.
The fact is that there are many possible types and
degrees of markets for water, depending on the system
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water fails an additional instrument to protect
themselves from this eventuality.
Furthermore, with a market that operates on the
basis of clearly defined water rights, farmers in conflict
have incentives to resolve their disputes through
commercial negotiation, which reduces the pressure on
the administrative system and means that it can be
oriented more towards management issues.
Again, the effect that the workings of the water
market have on the equity of an irrigation system
depends primarily on how well or badly other markets
function, like that for finance, and on how ownership
rights are allocated in the first place.
Because water is used in almost all economic and
productive activities, there needs to be a multisectoral
system of regulation. Agriculture is just one of the
customers for water, and although important, is has to
coexist in harmony with other sectors that use it. There
is no one “production chain” here, but a web of
interaction between sectors and user types.
This makes a far more sophisticated institutional
system vital, both to establish and manage water
ownership rights and to allocate water within the
system of rights and laws established. In this case, the
best thing is to create multisectoral authorities at the
river basin level, so that this additional complexity can
be dealt with at the right socio-ecological and
administrative level.
The argument of this paper, then, is that in Peru
it would be advisable to work towards the introduction
of market mechanisms for the allocation and
management of water in the different sectors, including
agriculture, where the country suffers particularly from
serious problems of efficiency, equity and sustainability.
A reform of this kind needs to be carried out carefully
and without haste, and particular consideration should
be given to the shortcomings of the State itself and of
irrigation organizations, which need to play an active,
voluntary role in the introduction of water trading
methods.
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